Th is paper evaluates recent fi ndings by researchers at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on "too much fi nance." It fi rst critiques the OECD fi ndings, which seem to imply that the optimal amount of fi nance is zero, given the linear specifi cation of the main tests. It then fi nds that the negative impact of additional fi nance on growth is reversed when the appropriate (purchasing-power-parity) per capita income is applied and country fi xed eff ects are removed. Separate tests for countries with intermediated fi nance below and above 60 percent of GDP show a signifi cant positive eff ect of fi nance on growth in the lower group but an insignifi cant eff ect in the higher group. An appendix replies to critics of my earlier study (Cline 2015b) in which I argued that an estimated negative quadratic eff ect of fi nance on growth was likely to be a spurious correlation refl ecting convergence-based lower growth at higher per capita incomes. It notes that the critics' own logarithmic tests, yielding a positive marginal impact of fi nance on growth even at high levels, achieve comparable explanation to their quadratic form yielding a negative marginal impact. It fi nds that adding dummy variables for below and above intermediate fi nancial depth to the logarithmic form does not support the inverse U infl uence found in the quadratic form.
BACKGROUND
In a recent PIIE Policy Brief, Too Much Finance or Statistical Illusion? (Cline 2015b) , I question recent statistical fi ndings that fi nancial depth has reached an excessive level in advanced economies and has contributed to a slowdown in growth as a consequence. Some studies have found that whereas a rising ratio of private credit to GDP initially spurs growth, once this ratio exceeds about 100 percent additional fi nance begins to reduce the growth rate. Th e key innovation in these studies is to add a quadratic term to the fi nance variable, and the key fi nding is that the quadratic term is negative so that the growth contribution of fi nance rises but then falls again after a peak (Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi 2012; Sahay et al. 2015) . 1 My critique of these studies is that there is an inherent mathematical bias toward fi nding a negative quadratic term on fi nance if there is a positive linear term and at the same time there is a positive trend relationship between fi nancial depth and per capita income. I demonstrate this bias by running statistical tests that also fi nd a signifi cant negative quadratic term if growth is "explained" by doctors per capita, or R&D researchers per capita, or the number of telephones per capita.
We should have no more confi dence in the fi nding that too much fi nance spoils growth than in the fi nding that too many doctors, R&D researchers, or telephones spoil growth. Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2015b) have issued a comment on my analysis. Appendix A sets forth my reply to their comment. Now a new study from another international fi nancial organization has arrived at statistical fi ndings with even more astonishing implications: For OECD countries, additional fi nancial depth uniformly reduces growth. 2 In the main results of two researchers at the OECD (Cournède and Denk 2015) , crosscountry growth equations show a strictly negative coeffi cient on a linear variable for fi nancial depth (ratio of private credit to GDP) without any quadratic term. If these results were taken literally, there would be a radical policy implication: Growth would be maximized by completely eliminating credit fi nance. Th e optimal amount of credit would be zero. Th e authors do conduct supplementary tests that suggest the infl uence of fi nance on growth is positive at initially low levels of fi nance, and this enables them to state in their abstract: "…fi nance has been a key ingredient of long-term economic growth in OECD and G20 countries over the past half-century…." But they then assert that "at current levels of household and business credit further expansion slows rather than boosts growth" (p. 3). However, they seek to support this conclusion on the basis of the strictly linear negative coeffi cient that is estimated for the full sample, including low-fi nancial-depth observations, and that test inescapably implies that the optimal level of fi nance is zero. Th e authors cannot reject the fully linear results when it comes to the implication of optimal zero fi nance but at the same time use them as the basis for asserting that at "current levels" the 1. For my oral comments on Sahay et al. (2015) , see the materials at www.piie.com/events/event_detail.cfm?EventID=396.
2. Th e three earlier studies just cited are by researchers at the IMF, Bank for International Settlements, and IMF, respectively.
impact of additional fi nance on growth is strictly negative. Th e authors' (proper) insistence on a positive growth infl uence of fi nance over an initial range seriously undermines the usefulness of their main estimates.
More fundamentally, even if attention is restricted to a range of private credit above say 60 percent of GDP, there is a major problem regarding causality. Higher per capita income is likely to drive relatively more demand for credit as, in eff ect, a luxury good. If so, when combined with the long-recognized "convergence" pattern of lower growth at higher per capita incomes, the eff ect will be that higher credit is observed to accompany lower growth but without causality. Reduction of credit would thus not boost growth because high credit is not causing low growth; instead, the maturing of the economy is slowing growth.
It turns out, moreover, that the study's main statistical fi nding does not hold up to certain key changes in specifi cation. Th is working paper uses the same dataset as Cournède and Denk (2015) , kindly provided by the authors, to examine this question.
3 Th e central fi ndings here are that the results of that study are unreliable because fi rst, the tests exclude the most important variable, real per capita income at purchasing power parity (ppp) comparable across countries; second, the tests apply country fi xed eff ects and thereby throw out important information on cross-country variation; and third, incorporation of shift and slope dummy variables for lower fi nancial depth removes the signifi cance of the negative infl uence of higher fi nancial levels on growth while tending to confi rm the expected positive infl uence at low levels.
THE COURNÈDE-DENK RESULTS
Cournède and Denk use data for 33 OECD countries for the period 1961-2011 to estimate crosscountry growth regressions incorporating a linear term on fi nance. I will focus on their results for "intermediated credit," credit to the private sector from either banks or other fi nancial institutions. 4 Table 1 reports their coeffi cient estimates for three specifi cations of regressions for per capita GDP growth. In the simplest, only the credit variable is included. It has a signifi cant negative sign. 5 In the second, once again annual data are applied, but other variables are added: the investment rate, average years of schooling, population growth rate, and a dummy variable for banking crisis. Again the credit variable has a signif-3. Th e Cournède-Denk results presented in table 1 as well as several others of their main results were successfully replicated from this database. Th ese replications are available on request.
4. Namely, lines 22d and 42d in the IMF's International Financial Statistics. Th e authors alternatively use the share of the fi nancial sector in value added, which they also fi nd has a negative eff ect on growth. In contrast, they fi nd that a third fi nancial variable, stock market capitalization as a percent of GDP, has a positive impact on growth.
5. Table 1 reports t-statistics in parentheses. For these sample sizes, the critical thresholds for signifi cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels are respectively: t = 2.6, 2.0, and 1.65.
icant negative coeffi cient. In the third variant, data are grouped into fi ve-year averages. Once again the credit variable has a signifi cantly negative impact.
6 Th e size of the negative impact of credit is extremely large. In the second and third columns, this coeffi cient is -0.019. Th is magnitude means that if credit to the private sector were reduced from 150 to 100 percent of GDP, the annual growth rate per capita would increase by 0.95 percent. If credit for such a country were eliminated altogether, then according to this linear equation the annual growth rate would rise by nearly 3 percentage points. Both the linearity (and hence optimal level of zero for credit) and the magnitude of the impact are implausible.
Nor are these results consistent with saying that although by now the OECD has gone too far in fi nance, at earlier periods of lower fi nancial depth more fi nance meant more growth, even though the authors seek to argue that this is the case. Th e absence of a quadratic term and the presence of a negative coeffi cient on the linear term for fi nance mean that additional fi nance reduces growth across the entire period and all OECD countries. Yet several countries had surprisingly low fi nancial depth at the beginning of this period. 7. Th at is: -0.019 x (83 -14.5) = -1.3.
8. Th at is: 1.013 40 = 2.12.
9. As discussed in note 26 below, the graphical results they show on this issue do not fulfi ll this purpose. Th e authors explicitly include "country fi xed eff ects," equivalent to a dummy variable for each country, and thereby throw out potentially important cross-country information. In the tests conducted here, it turns out that this important decision is responsible for turning the infl uence of fi nance from positive to negative. Yet it is arguably inappropriate, and at best the case for including country fi xed eff ects is ambiguous.
REESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE CREDIT
In reexamining the Cournède-Denk results, a crucial fi rst question is thus whether to include country fi xed eff ects. Classic early studies of cross-country growth typically did not include country fi xed eff ects.
Instead, they sought to obtain more variation by allowing independent variables to vary both across and within countries. Th ese studies include King and Levine (1993) on fi nance; Sachs and Warner (1999) on natural resources; and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) on human capital. Although some later studies have included country fi xed eff ects, Barro (2012) has cast doubt on doing so. He observes:
"Inclusion of country fi xed eff ects…aff ects the estimated coeffi cients of explanatory variables… variables that have little within-country time variation cannot be estimated with precision. In eff ect, the inclusion of country fi xed eff ects throws out much of the information in isolating the eff ects of X variables on growth rates." 13 (Barro 2012, 5) 10. Th at is: -0.019 x 75 = -1.4; -0.019 x 190 = -3.6.
11. Since -0.019 x 60 = -1.1, the previous calculation of growth impact (3.6 percent) would be shifted upward over the range by +1.1 percentage point, thus yielding 2.5 percent.
12. Th us even the scale of the variable diff ers sharply with the currency across countries.
13. In particular, Barro maintains that the failure of Acemoglu et al. (2008) to fi nd statistically signifi cant eff ects on democracy from per capita GDP and education stems from their inclusion of country fi xed eff ects.
6
Th e most important driver of growth in cross-country tests has traditionally been the convergence factor captured by the logarithm of ppp income per capita. Th is variable becomes irrelevant when country fi xed eff ects are applied, and Cournède and Denk instead apply the (lagged) logarithm of each country's own national real per capita income. Important variation is sacrifi ced as a consequence.
14 Whether to use country fi xed eff ects is related to whether growth convergence is "absolute" or "conditional." In absolute convergence, poorer countries would tend to grow faster than richer countries, and by implication all countries would eventually tend to converge to the same real per capita income.
Th e early cross-country growth literature applying ppp income estimates when they became available instead confronted the paradox that for 1960-90, poor countries were not growing more rapidly than rich countries, and indeed were growing more slowly (Barro 1996 , Sala-i-Martin 1996 . Th is fi nding led to a focus on "conditional convergence," in which each country could be converging to its own individual long-term per capita income, which could diff er from those of other countries. Such variables as saving rates, human capital formation, trade openness, legal institutions, and so forth were seen as infl uencing the long-term growth potential, and when such variables were included, the coeffi cient of per capita growth on the per capita income (lagged, logarithm) tended to revert to the expected negative sign rather than showing a positive sign. In this context it was a natural step to go further and apply a country fi xed eff ect to capture still other unobservable (or "omitted variable") infl uences not captured in these and similar variables (Islam 1995) .
It turns out, however, that beginning in the 1990s growth per capita in emerging-market and developing countries rose increasingly above that in advanced countries, such that the evidence shifted toward absolute rather than conditional convergence. Th us, per capita growth was only 1.9 percent in developing countries versus 2.4 percent in advanced countries in 1981-90 (which included Latin America's "lost decade" from the debt crisis). In successive decades, however, this comparison swung to 2.2 versus 2.0 percent, respectively, in 1989-98; 4.1 versus 2.1 percent in 1997-2006; and, 
in the Great
Recession and its aftermath, 4.1 versus 0.27 percent in 2008 -14 (IMF 1999 2015, 170) . With less need to seek conditional rather than absolute convergence, the case for sacrifi cing variation in order to capture unobserved country-specifi c infl uences has presumably declined.
In the specifi c case of the Cournède-Denk estimates for the OECD, moreover, the countries included in the sample are much more homogeneous than in most cross-country tests, providing an important additional reason for excluding country fi xed eff ects. An additional consideration is that in cross-country conditional convergence and thereby reduce the magnitudes and statistical signifi cance of coeffi cients of explanatory variables (Hauk and Wacziarg 2009, 105 ).
In at least one regard, a plausible case can be made for including rather than excluding country fi xed eff ects: Th e fi nance variable does move substantially, providing some potential basis for obtaining discrimination using within-country only variance. Nonetheless, because the key infl uence of crosscountry diff erence in real per capita income is thrown out when country fi xed eff ects are used, and because this infl uence is surely the most fundamental in the cross-country growth literature, this reason alone is suffi cient to prefer tests omitting country fi xed eff ects over tests including them. Th e fi rst major decision in specifi cation of the new tests conducted here, then, is to exclude country fi xed eff ects.
Another decision concerns the time period. Th e tests here end in 2007 growth, to avoid distortions from the Great Recession. Another key question is whether to use annual data or period averages. Th e main estimates here use fi ve-year averages (the same approach adopted in both Cecchetti and Kharroubi 2012 and Panizza 2012) . Th e use of annual data instead will tend to introduce a bias toward a negative infl uence of fi nance on growth from cyclical patterns. Namely, in a recession, the magnitude of debt in the fi nance variable numerator will tend to rise from accumulation of unpaid balances, whereas the GDP denominator will tend to decline because of lower output.
Another question is whether to include investment as an explanatory variable. Because investment directly drives growth, presumably the most interesting question is whether greater fi nancial depth benefi ts growth indirectly through facilitating higher investment. Th e tests here omit investment because otherwise there will be a tendency to understate the infl uence of fi nance working through facilitation of investment. In contrast, columns C and D represent "misleading" results, either because they include country fi xed eff ects or because they use annual rather than longer-period average data. In column C, inclusion of country fi xed eff ects turns the coeffi cient of the fi nance variable negative using the fi ve-year average data.
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In column D, the use of annual rather than fi ve-year data also turns the coeffi cient on fi nancial depth negative, even without country fi xed eff ects.
It is useful to apply tests that are more in keeping with what the authors truly think: tests with specifi cations that allow the infl uence of fi nance on growth to diverge between countries at lower levels of fi nance and those at higher levels, rather than the one-size-fi ts-all negative linear coeffi cient. For this purpose, the most reasonable dividing point is a ratio of private credit to GDP of 60 percent or less. Th is is the threshold at which their supplementary tests show inclusion of observations with greater fi nancial depth begins to turn the coeffi cient on fi nance from positive to negative (Cournède and Denk 2015, 29 18. Cross-country studies of returns to education have tended to fi nd that the percent increase in wages holds relatively constant at, for example, about 10 percent, for each year of schooling added, and is actually higher at the tertiary level than at the secondary level (Montenegro and Patrinos 2013) . Th e absolute average number of years of schooling of the adult population thus turns out to be a more appropriate specifi cation than, for example, the percent change in number of years (which could be disproportionately larger for countries and periods with low initial average schooling levels).
19. Th at is: the natural logarithm of 2 is 0.6932. Multiplying by 0.277 yields 0.19 increase in the dependent variable for a doubling of the underlying fi nance variable (and hence an increase in its logarithm by the logarithm of 2).
20. Th e higher R 2 results mechanically from inclusion of the country dummies.
21. In view of their evidence of a positive relationship at lower fi nancial depth, it is surprising that "no evidence is found of a quadratic relationship with GDP growth…." (Cournède and Denk 2015, 25) .
samples: one including only country-periods with private credit less than 60 percent of GDP, and the other including all others. An alternative means of conducting this test is to include all observations, but to add a dummy variable for those cases with the fi nance variable less than 60 percent of GDP and allow it to interact with the fi nance variable.
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As shown in table 3, when these tests are conducted, and using the preferred model specifi cation of column B in table 2, the results are much closer to what one would expect. Th e infl uence of additional fi nance is positive and statistically signifi cant in the below-60 group (column A). Th e infl uence turns negative but is statistically insignifi cant in the above-60 group (column B). In the combined test, the infl uence of the logarithm of fi nance is again negative but statistically insignifi cant. However, the interaction term shows that this coeffi cient turns sizable and positive if the country-period has private credit of below 60 percent of GDP, although the coeffi cient is not signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
23
When the exact variables applied by Cournède and Denk are applied to the above 60 percent subsample, using fi ve-year averages, the negative linear coeffi cient of growth on private credit as a percent of GDP is confi rmed and is highly signifi cant. Th e log of lagged (national) GDP per capita has the right sign and is signifi cant. But investment is not signifi cant; schooling has the wrong sign and is signifi cant;
and population growth has the wrong sign. For the below-60 observations, however, private credit still has a negative sign, although the coeffi cient is small and insignifi cant. Schooling, population growth, and lagged national GDP per capita all have the wrong signs. Only investment has the right sign.
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Two broad patterns can be seen in these tests. First, the results for the below-60 group are extremely weak, again strongly suggesting that the use of country fi xed eff ects and the use of lagged national rather than ppp GDP per capita income robs the explanatory role of just about all infl uences (including credit) except investment. Second, the poor results on the other variables raise the question of why one should trust the signifi cant negative eff ect on credit in the above-60 group.
In summary, the main results reported in Cournède and Denk (2015) do not provide a solid basis for concluding that "at current levels" OECD fi nance is so excessive that it depresses growth, because as the authors recognize it does not apply to lower levels of fi nance and therefore its test statistics are not 23. Th e size of the coeffi cient becomes the sum of the fi rst row entry in column C and the 5th row entry (0.162 + 0.964 = 0.802).
24. If the same exercise is repeated but removing country fi xed eff ects, the above-60 group again shows a signifi cant negative coeffi cient on private credit, and investment has the right sign and is signifi cant. But schooling, population growth, and the logarithm of lagged per capita GDP all have the wrong signs. Because the estimate for the most important variable, logarithm of lagged per capita GDP, is meaningless-likely refl ecting the use of noncomparable national per capita GDP levels rather than ppp-the result for private credit warrants little credibility. Th ese results and those just discussed (incorporating country fi xed eff ects) are available on request.
reliable. Separate tests that distinguish between low and high levels of fi nance fi nd a signifi cant positive eff ect at low levels but do not fi nd a statistically signifi cant eff ect at high levels. Moreover, even if the full set of data is examined without distinguishing between low and high fi nance observations, the sign of the fi nance variable switches back to positive rather than being negative if an arguably more appropriate specifi cation is applied. 25 Th is specifi cation involves: (a) incorporating the traditional workhorse variable for cross-country growth regressions: logarithm of lagged ppp per capita income; (b) excluding rather than including country fi xed eff ects; and (c) applying fi ve-year averages rather than annual data. Th eir fi nding that more fi nance depresses growth is thus not robust to these three relatively basic alternatives (or, I would say, improvements).
Finally, it should be emphasized that even if a negative linear eff ect were robust to estimation just for the above 60 percent of GDP private credit group, applying the logarithm of lagged ppp per capita income and omitting country fi xed eff ects, there would still be the problem of likely reverse causation.
Th e authors do attempt to address causality by constructing an instrumental variable for private credit, based on changes in national fi nancial regulatory requirements. However, not only do they again apply the analysis to the full sample rather than just observations above 60 percent of GDP in private credit, but in addition they do not include lagged per capita income in their growth equations at all (neither ppp nor national), a strange test considering the primacy of this convergence variable in the cross-country growth literature.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Literally accepting the main results reported by Cournède-Denk would have the radical policy implication that the ideal amount of fi nancial intermediation is no fi nancial intermediation at all. Th e authors themselves instead argue that at initially lower levels of fi nance, additional fi nance benefi ts growth, but they do not then conduct appropriate tests that verify a shift to statistically signifi cant negative eff ects of fi nance at higher levels.
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In contrast to the main results in linear specifi cation of Cournède and Denk (2015) , the quadratic specifi cations in Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2012) and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) indicate a large initial range over which more fi nance brings higher rather than lower growth. Even those formulations 25. Because the positive coeffi cient is not statistically signifi cant, however, the respecifi cation demonstrates only that the relationship of growth to fi nance is not signifi cantly negative rather than that it is positive.
26. Th eir tests reported in graphical form for successively higher thresholds of credit include all lower-credit observations at each point, and at the upper extreme return to their main reported full-sample results. As a consequence that series of tests does not constitute evidence regarding a statistically signifi cant negative infl uence of additional fi nance within a subset of observations over a 60 percent credit threshold versus that below this threshold.
yield what I suggest are unreliable turning points that advanced economies have supposedly already exceeded (Cline 2015b and appendix A below).
Th at three empirical studies by teams at three international organizations nonetheless come out with the same implication that there is already too much fi nance in such economies as that of the United
States is potentially a powerful message for policy. In particular, in the Basel Committee reforms boosting required capital for banks, a key consideration has been whether too much required capital might discourage lending and curb growth because of a resulting decline in the rate of investment. But if the Too Much Finance results were taken literally, that outcome could be a good thing rather than a bad thing, because reducing the amount of fi nance relative to GDP would (at least over the highest range) boost growth rather than reduce it. A central purpose of this study as well as the analysis in Cline (2015b) is to
show that these studies do not have suffi ciently robust fi ndings on negative eff ects of fi nance to warrant a general policy stance welcoming rather than seeking to avoid shrinkage of fi nance as a consequence of higher capital regulatory requirements.
Some might argue nonetheless that the absence of a statistically signifi cant positive eff ect of fi nance on growth in the higher ranges of fi nancial depth means that the benefi ts of lesser risk of fi nancial crisis as a consequence of even sharply higher capital requirements for fi nancial institutions could be obtained at no cost to the economy. But cross-country growth regressions, especially with insignifi cant coeffi cients, are not a reliable basis for evaluating optimal capital requirements. Instead, a more reliable basis for investigating this issue is to use a calibrated model comparing the costs associated with higher capital requirements against the benefi ts they provide through reduced risk of fi nancial crises.
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27. Economic costs from higher cost of capital and lesser capital formation associated with a shift from debt to equity will be present if the Modigliani-Miller off set (reduction in unit cost of equity capital as leverage and risk decline) is incomplete (as found in Cline 2015a). Leading examples of the calibrated cost-benefi t approach include Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012) and BCBS (2010). Source: Author's calculations. 
APPENDIX A REPLY TO ARCAND, BERKES, AND PANIZZA
In Cline (2015b), I argued that statistical fi ndings of a negative quadratic infl uence of fi nance on growth were questionable. I showed that if causation went the other way, from rising per capita income to rising fi nancial depth, for example, because home mortgages are a luxury good, a quadratic term relating growth to fi nance would have a spurious negative coeffi cient. Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2015b) , authors of one of the key papers in this literature, have responded in an indepth (10-page) comment.
Before turning to the critiques in their comment, it is important to emphasize that even in their own study, the three authors (referred to as ABP hereafter) found virtually equal statistical performance of a formulation in which the infl uence of fi nance was logarithmic rather than quadratic. As a consequence, their own results suggest that there is little basis for stating that the infl uence of extra credit turns negative beyond some point rather than that this infl uence tapers off but remains positive. Th us, their Th e authors do apply a statistical test to verify that their quadratic function relating growth to fi nance has a positive linear and negative quadratic term, yielding an inverse-U shape. 29 However, they do not apply a similar test for whether an inverse-U is signifi cantly superior to the monotonic logarithmic form.
When I apply such a test to the OECD data by adding low-and high-side dummy variables to the equation using the logarithm of private credit relative to GDP, the results do not provide much if any support for the inverse-U eff ect. 29. Th e test is that proposed by Sasabuchi (1980) and Lind and Mehlum (2010) . It involves determining, given the covariancecovariance matrix of x i and 2x i (respectively the linear and quadratic contributions to the derivative of growth with respect to fi nance, where  is the linear coeffi cient and  the quadratic), whether the derivative is signifi cantly diff erent from zero and positive at a low level of fi nance but negative at a high level within the sample.
30. I set the low and high dummies at D L =1 when private credit is less than 65 percent of GDP and D H = 1 when it is more than 124 percent, the signifi cance thresholds identifi ed by Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2015a) . Inclusion of these dummies has practically no eff ect on the estimates of the coeffi cients on either the logarithm of per capita ppp GDP or schooling, although it raises the coeffi cient on the logarithm of fi nance and turns it signifi cant. However, the coeffi cient on the low-end dummy turns out to be positive and thus has the wrong sign for a strong inverse-U form, and although the high-end dummy is negative, it is not signifi cant at even the 10 percent level.
If policies were aggressively pursued based on the inverse-U infl uence of fi nance on growth, punitive taxes could be required to shrink credit by more than 60 percent in such economies as the United States and the United Kingdom (where the 2010 levels reached 195 and 202 percent of GDP, respectively).
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But a diff erence in explanatory power that does not show up until the second decimal place in the R 2 is too slim to warrant such policies.
Regarding the critiques of my policy brief in their recent comment, ABP (2015b) fi rst noted that my equations demonstrated not that the quadratic term on fi nance was necessarily negative and spuriously so, but rather that if the linear term was positive, then the quadratic term had to be negative. But the signs could also be the reverse. Th at observation is true, but it is also trivial and does not constitute a meaningful critique. Inspection of my relevant equation makes it clear that the sign of the linear term does indeed have to be the opposite of the sign of the quadratic term (subject to an additional specifi c threshold if the linear term is negative). Namely, I showed that if half of the observed reduction in growth as per capita income rises is spuriously attributed to a quadratic infl uence of fi nance (rather than underlying convergence), then:
Here,  is the coeffi cient of growth on the quadratic term of fi nance and  is the coeffi cient on the linear term of fi nance, in a regression equation explaining growth per capita on three variables: the level (or more accurately, logarithm) of per capita income; fi nance (e.g., private credit as a percent of GDP); and fi nance squared. Th e other terms are per capita income (or its logarithm), x; the true parameter relating growth to per capita income, ; and the terms in a simple linear relationship showing the response of fi nance to per capita income (constant  and linear coeffi cient  on per capita income). With all terms in the equation except either  or  positive, then if  is positive, the numerator on the right side is strictly negative and so  on the left side must be negative. However, it is also possible that the quadratic coeffi cient  will be positive, so long as not only  is negative but also | > 0.5.
But the latter condition is only a curiosity. In the large empirical literature relating growth to fi nance, there is to my knowledge not a single signifi cant fi nding that additional fi nance at fi rst reduces growth but eventually (say after fi nance reaches 100 percent of GDP) increases growth again, such that  < 0 while  > 0. So in the relevant application, estimating the infl uence of fi nance on growth, it is strictly the case of positive linear infl uence that would generate a spurious negative quadratic infl uence. In any event, it is unclear why ABP should be so content that any spurious infl uence would have to show up with an 31. Th e cuts needed to reduce credit to 76 percent of GDP, the turning point identifi ed in Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2015a) . Data are from World Bank (2015).
opposite sign for the quadratic term from that on the linear term. If they agree to that proposition, then they would have to recognize that their own tests preclude the result that both the linear and quadratic terms are positive, yet that is the implied alternative to their test results in which the linear is positive and the quadratic negative. If that alternative is impossible, they have set up a test that cannot be rejected, and it is not a meaningful test.
Th e second critique of ABP is that if the quadratic term on fi nance is spuriously negative because of a pattern of greater fi nancial depth as a consequence of higher per capita income, then by the same approach I used to arrive at equation A1, it would follow that in a simple linear regression of growth on per capita income and a simple (linear only) fi nance variable the coeffi cient on the latter would be
negative, yet the empirical literature fi nds it is positive. In other words, if growth decelerates as per capita income rises, and if fi nance deepens as per capita income rises, then any spurious attribution would fi nd that deeper fi nance reduces rather than increases growth.
But a more fruitful way to think about this issue would be to consider two types of fi nance: one that causes growth and the other that responds as a luxury good to rising relative demand as per capita income rises. For simplicity, the fi rst would be business loans and the second, home mortgages and loans for consumer durables. Th e system I spelled out would apply to the second category of fi nance, not the fi rst.
Empirical results primarily capturing the fi rst type would fi nd a positive coeffi cient of growth on fi nance.
Th ose primarily refl ecting the second type would fi nd a negative simple linear coeffi cient of growth on fi nance, which may explain the negative coeffi cients in the Cournède-Denk (2015) study. Importantly, in this interpretation, reduction of fi nance will not increase growth, any more than a luxury tax shifting consumption away from any other luxury good would increase overall growth.
Th ird, ABP take issue with my critique that their parameters indicate that implausibly large increases in growth rates could be achieved by shrinking the fi nancial sector. I illustrated my point using the case of Japan, which (using their coeffi cients) could supposedly raise the growth rate by 1.6 percentage point by reducing credit to the private sector from 178 to 90 percent of GDP. Th ey cite an alternative set of estimates, controlling for banking crises, in which reducing credit from 178 to 90 percent of GDP in Japan would boost growth by "only" 0.95 percentage point. I would consider this alternative also implausible. Th ey go on to insist that "regressions … are not meant to, and do not, fi t all points (the regression's R 2 is never one) … [so] it is singularly inappropriate to pick out a specifi c data point to purportedly invalidate a result." But the Japan example I gave does not involve Japan's actual residual but instead simply applies the regression line to two alternative credit levels (which the line would also predict for any other country at comparable credit levels). Nor is the large impact for Japan unrepresentative.
Th us, if we take ABP's apparently preferred model (controlling for banking crises, 
